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ABSTRACT
In peer-to-peer data management systems query allocation
is a critical issue for the good operation of the system. This
task is challenging because participants may prefer to per-
form some queries than others. Microeconomic mechanisms
aim at dealing with this, but, to the best of our knowledge,
none of them has ever proposed experimental validations
that, beyond query load or response time, use measures that
are outside the microeconomic scope. The contribution of
this paper is twofold. We present a virtual money-based
query allocation process that is suitable for large-scale su-
per peer systems. We compare a non microeconomic medi-
ation with micro-economic ones from a satisfaction point of
view. The experimental results show that the providers’ in-
voice phase is as much important as the providers’ selection
phase for a virtual money-based mediation.
1. INTRODUCTION
We consider a peer-to-peer (P2P) data management sys-
tem with mediators that enable consumers to access dis-
tributed information providers through queries [6], such as
super peer systems. Consumers and providers (for clarity,
we refer to both together as participants) are autonomous in
the sense that they are free to enter and leave the system at
will and do not depend on anyone to do so. The main func-
tion of the mediator is to allocate each incoming query to
the providers that can answer it. In this context, it is crucial
to ensure good system performance, e.g. high throughput
or low response times. Nevertheless, participants may get
satisfied by the mediator because of certain expectations
that are not only performance-related. These participants’
expectations are clearly illustrated by Google AdWords [1],
which proposes relevant commercial providers to consumers
and relevant consumers to commercial providers according
to some keywords of their interest.
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To capture this intuition, we have proposed a definition
of satisfaction [9] of the participants. The satisfaction of a
provider after several query allocations is evaluated consid-
ering its intentions w.r.t. the queries that it has been allo-
cated. Satisfaction is defined as a long run notion, to capture
the fact that the provider is “globally” satisfied even if it is
sometimes allocated queries it does not intend to treat. We
have proposed a same kind of definition to characterize the
consumers’ satisfaction. We have also proposed a mediation
process, called SQLB mediation, which allocates a query
considering the participants’ intentions with respect to the
query and their current satisfaction. We implemented the
SQLB mediation within a mediator and run experimenta-
tions with a single mediator and many participants. The
results show that SQLB has very good system performance
in maintaining a good satisfaction for participants (as far as
they are adequate to the system) and low response times.
However, directly considering the participants’ intentions
and current satisfaction in the mediation process may have
some drawbacks. First, the process suits only in cases where
the participants agree to show their intentions with respect
to the queries. Second, scaling up to several mediators re-
quires a high message traffic. Indeed, the mediator can no
longer calculate the providers’ satisfactions itself, because,
in case of a provider using several mediators, its satisfaction
results from the queries obtained with the different media-
tors. Thus either each provider has to inform each mediator
of its current satisfaction or the mediators have to exchange
information about the providers’ satisfaction. In both cases,
network traffic increases significantly.
A way to regulate query allocation with less information
exchange is to use virtual money. This latter expression
means that this money is totally disconnected from the real
money we use in current life. When using virtual money,
the providers no longer show their intentions directly, but
rather bid on the incoming queries. Thus, the mediation
process considers the providers’ bids to allocate the queries.
In case of several mediators, the same virtual money can be
used by the different mediators. It can be considered as the
common denominator of the different mediation processes,
which use the bids, and possibly other elements to decide
the allocation. On the other side, a participant’s satisfaction
still depends on the work of the different mediators and thus
it is still important to satisfy participants.
In this context, several works use microeconomic mecha-
nisms to allocate resources in distributed systems. However,
to the best of our knowledge, none of them has ever pro-
posed experimental validations, which, beyond query load
or response time, use measures that are outside the mi-
croeconomic scope. Thus, the main contribution of this
paper is twofold. First, we present a virtual money-based
query allocation process that (i) is participant-centric, (ii)
behaves as good as SQLB, and (iii) scales up to several
mediators. Second, from a methodological point of view, it
is interesting to compare a non microeconomic mediation
(namely SQLB) with microeconomic ones (namely FPSB,
V MbQA, and V MbQA
+), using satisfaction as a “money
independent” evaluation measure in both cases.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give
some preliminary concepts and definitions. In Section 3, we
discuss the use of virtual money when designing a media-
tion process. We present in Section 4 a virtual money-based
query allocation process and improve this mediation process
in Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss how the mediation pro-
cess we propose can normally perform in super peer systems.
Finally, we present related work and conclude this paper in
Sections 7 and 8, respectively.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we make precise the query allocation prob-
lem in environments where participants are autonomous.
With this in mind, in Section 2.1, we discuss in more detail
the system that we consider and describe, in Section 2.2,
how participants compute their satisfaction. Finally, in Sec-
tion 2.3, we state the query allocation problem in such sys-
tems and, in Section 2.4, we present a solution to this prob-
lem, which we use as baseline mediation.
2.1 System Model
The distributed system we wish to control consists of a
mediator m and of a set I of autonomous participants, who
may play two different roles: consumer and provider. Par-
ticipants are autonomous in the sense that they may enter
and leave the system at any time and are free to join and
quit a mediator m ∈ M at will. A mediator m allocates
queries of a set C of consumers (with C ⊆ I) to a set P of
providers (with P ⊆ I) and returns results or a set of se-
lected providers (depending on the system architecture) to
consumers. As a participant may play both consumer’s and
provider’s roles, it is possible to have C ∩ P 6= ∅.
A consumer poses a query to the mediator when it cannot
locally perform the query or just because it has certain gains
by outsourcing such a query. For example, a consumer may
query the system to perform a given application because
(i) it has not enough resources to run the application, or
(ii) other participant (a provider) performs the application
faster. Queries are formulated in a format abstracted as a
triple q = < c, d, n > such that q.c ∈ C is the identifier of
the query initiator (the consumer), q.d is the description of
the task to be done, e.g. a SQL statement, and q.n ∈ N∗
is the number of providers to which consumer q.c wishes to
allocate its query.
Providers in P have different processing capabilities and
capacities for performing incoming queries. On the one
hand, different processing capabilities mean that providers
provide different data and thus produce different results for
a same query. On the other hand, different processing ca-
pacities mean that some providers are more powerful than
others and thus can treat more queries per time unit. The
capacity of a provider p ∈ P , capp > 0, denotes the number
of computational units (expressed e.g. in time units) that
it has to perform queries. In the same way, a query q has a
cost, costp(q) > 0, that represents the computational units
that it consumes at provider p. Thus, the utilization of a
provider p ∈ P at a given time t, Ut(p), is defined as p’s
load with respect to its capacity. In other words, function
Ut(p) denotes the total cost of the queries that have been
allocated to p and have not already been treated at time t.
A participant i ∈ I is free to express its intention to al-
locate and perform a query and it is up to it to compute
its own intentions by combining different local and external
criteria (e.g. load, preferences, and reputation). The inten-
tions are denoted by values in the interval of [−1..1]. If an
intention is positive, the greater the value, the greater the
desire of a participant that a possibility becomes a reality.
In contrast, if an intention is negative, the closer the value
from −1, the greater the desire of a participant to do not
see a possibility becomes a reality. It is worth noting that
even if participants can express their intentions it does not
mean that they can refuse queries.
2.2 Participant’s Satisfaction
Intuitively, a participant i ∈ I is satisfied with the query
allocation process if the latter meets its intentions in the
long-run. The satisfaction of a participant may have a deep
impact on the system, because the participant may decide
whether to stay or to leave the system based on it. Re-
cently, we proposed a complete model that characterizes au-
tonomous participants by formally defining the adequation,
satisfaction, and allocation satisfaction of a participant [9].
We briefly present in this section the intuitions of a par-
ticipant’s satisfaction. To discuss further this notion and
present the adequation and allocation satisfaction notions is
beyond the scope of this paper.
The consumer’s satisfaction allows to evaluate whether
the mediator is allocating the queries of a consumer to the
providers that the consumer wants to deal with. To compute
its satisfaction, δs(c), a consumer c ∈ C proceeds as follows,
δs(c) =
1
||IQkc ||
X
q∈IQkc
1
n
“
X
p∈cPq
`−→
CIq[p] + 1
´
.
2
”
(1)
where n stands for q.n, IQkc denotes the set of k last queries
issued by c, cPq is the set of providers that performed q, and
−→
CIq[p] is the intention expressed by c towards provider p.
The provider’s satisfaction evaluates whether the media-
tor is giving queries to a provider according to its expecta-
tions (those of the provider) so that it fulfills its objectives.
Thus, as for consumers, a provider is simply not satisfied
when it does not get what it expects. To evaluate so, a
provider p ∈ P computes its satisfaction, δs(p), as follows,
δs(p) =
˛
˛
˛
˛
˛
˛
˛
“
` 1
||SQkp ||
X
q∈SQkp
−−→
PPIp[q]
´
+ 1
”.
2
0 if SQkp = ∅
(2)
where SQkp denotes the set of queries performed by p and
−−→
PPIp[q] is the intention expressed by p towards query q.
Notice that both above equations may be stated with respect
to the participants’ preferences as well.
2.3 Query Allocation Problem
Let Pq denote the set of providers registered to mediator
m, which does not appear in the notation for simplicity, and
(a) SQLB-based (b) virtual money-based
Figure 1: System architecture. Peer M denotes the
mediator, c a consumer, and p a provider.
that can deal with an incoming query q. We only consider
the arrival of those queries for which Pq 6= ∅. Thus, the
allocation of query q is denoted by a vector All−→ocq of length
N (with N = ||Pq ||) such that,
∀p ∈ Pq , All
−→oc [p] =
1 if p gets the request
0 otherwise
Set cPq denotes the set of providers such that All
−→ocq = 1,
whose length is min(q.n, N). In other words, if the number
of providers that are able to deal with a query q is smaller or
equal than the number of desired providers by a consumer,
all the providers in Pq must perform q. Given all the above,
we can then state the query allocation problem in mono-
mediator systems with autonomous participants as follows.
Definition 1. Query Allocation Problem Given a
mediator m confronted to ||I|| autonomous participants, m
should allocate each incoming query q to a set cPq such that
||cPq || = min(q.n, N) and good system performance as well
as participants’ intentions are satisfied in the long-run.
2.4 SQLB Mediation
SQLB allocates queries by balancing consumers’ and
providers’ intentions in accordance to their satisfaction. In
that work, we experimentally proved that SQLB ensures
good system performances and satisfies, in the long-run, the
participants’ intentions, which allows it to scale up in en-
vironments with autonomous participants. This is why we
consider it as a baseline method in the remainder of this
paper. The general system architecture is shown by Fig-
ure 1(a) and the principle of SQLB is the following. A
consumer (the user) sends a query q to the mediator, which
must find set Pq and ask for q.c’s intentions regarding each
provider in Pq . Also, it must ask for Pq’s intention for per-
forming q. Once the mediator obtains such information, it
computes the score of each provider p ∈ Pq by making a
balance between q.c’s and p’s intentions and computes the
ranking of providers in Pq based on their score. Finally, it
allocates q to the q.n best scored providers in Pq and informs
all participants of the mediation result.
3. USE OF VIRTUAL MONEY
We now consider the introduction of virtual money within
the system so as to allow a system to scale up more eas-
ily. Notice that this money is purely virtual. This point
has to be stressed upon for two main reasons. First, we do
not focus on any particular business model: we only use the
virtual money as a means to regulate the query allocation
in the system. Indeed, after a consumer has decided which
providers it chooses, it might give real money to them be-
cause it uses their services. This point is far beyond the
focus of this paper. Second, when using real money, one
can assume that consumers and providers get money from
elsewhere. For example, when designing an auction mecha-
nism for e-commerce one can assume that people spend the
money they have earned by working (in real life). When
dealing with virtual money, one can no longer make such
assumptions. Therefore, in our case, to correctly regulate
the system, we must precise the way in which the virtual
money circulates within it. This is a macro-economic con-
cern for which we adopt a simple solution for the mechanism
we propose. First, only the providers and the mediator deal
with virtual money, i.e. the consumers still show their inten-
tions. The policy used to regulate the money flow depends
on the mechanism. We decide that, in case the mediator
earns money while the providers get poorer and poorer, the
mediator distributes the money to the providers; That is, to
avoid that the lack of virtual money influences the regulation
effect of our mechanism, when the virtual money earned by
the mediator is above some threshold, it is distributed again
among all providers in an equitable way.
Now, designing the allocation mechanism used by the me-
diator is a micro-economic concern. Providers no longer ex-
press their intentions directly to the mediator. Instead, they
have to express their intentions through bids, which also con-
siders their current virtual money balance as well as their
strategy to bid. Notice that the general architecture of the
virtual money-based system is almost the same that when
one does not use virtual money (see Figure 1(b)). The only
thing that changes is that the mediator now asks providers
for their bids instead of their intentions and has to invoice
providers at the end of each query allocation. Therefore, the
design of a specific allocation mechanism first requires to de-
fine the way in which the mediator merges the consumers’
intentions with the providers’ bids so as to select providers.
This is the selection phase. Second, we consider in this work
systems where providers have to “pay” for performing or re-
ceiving queries1. Thus, in such models, one has to define
the way in which the mediator invoices providers after each
query allocation. This is the invoicing phase. Finally, one
has to define how providers compute their bids.
4. VMBQA MEDIATION
We present in this section Virtual Money-based Query Al-
location (V MbQA), a particular query allocation method
that takes into account both consumers’ intentions and
providers’ bid. V MbQA assumes that consumers show their
intentions (denoted by vector
−→
CI ) to the mediator, while
providers bid on queries instead (which is a means to reflect
their intentions while keeping them private). In Section 4.1,
we define the process itself and then define how a provider
computes its bids in Section 4.2. Finally, we evaluate in Sec-
tion 4.3 how well V MbQA allocates queries among providers.
4.1 Definition of the Process
Let us consider the allocation of some query q initiated
1This is in some way similar to an invoicing such as the one
of Google AdWords [1], except we consider virtual money.
by some consumer c ∈ C. The providers in Pq bid on q and
such bids are not public to others. The bids are represented
by a vector
−→
B , with
−→
B [p] ∈ R for all p ∈ Pq. If a bid is pos-
itive, the higher it is, the more p wants to be allocated q. If
it is negative, the lower it is the less p wants to treat q. Intu-
itively, the bid of p reflects its intention to perform q. This
should lead to the providers’ satisfaction. We detail the way
in which V MbQA allocates queries among providers in Sec-
tion 4.1.1 and define the way in which it invoices providers
in Section 4.1.2.
4.1.1 Selection phase
Let us remember that a query q is allocated to the
min(n, N) best providers, which are given by vector of
ranking
−→
R . Intuitively,
−→
R [1] = p if and only if p is the
best ranked,
−→
R [2] stands for the second best ranked and so
on. Hence, All−→ocq [p] = 1 if and only if ∃i,
−→
R [i] = p and
i ≤ min(n, N). Traditionally, vector
−→
R is computed with
respect to the providers’ bids only. Then, a simple solu-
tion to select providers may be the first-price sealed-bid ap-
proach, which selects the provider having made the highest
bid. However, this is a provider-centric approach that pe-
nalizes consumers’ intentions. Thus, to satisfy consumers,
V MbQA allocates queries based on the providers’ level and
computes vector
−→
R with regards to these levels (denoted
by vector
−→
L ) such that, given an incoming query q, the
provider with the highest level is allocated q. We formally
define providers’ level, denoted by vector
−→
L , concerning a
query q as Definition 2. Given this definition, a query might
be allocated to a provider that did not want it. We call this
an imposition case, otherwise, we have a competition case.
Definition 2. Provider’s Level Given an incoming
query q, the level of each p ∈ Pq is defined as follows,
−→
L [p] =
˛
˛
˛
˛
˛
(
−→
B [p] + 1)ω × (
−→
CIq [p] + 1)
1−ω if
−→
B [p] ≥ 0
−(−
−→
B [p] + 1)ω × (
−→
CIq[p] + 1)
ω−1 otherwise
Parameter ω, whose values are in the interval [0..1]),
ensures the balance between consumers’ intentions and
providers’ bids. In SQLB a mediator set this parameter
according to participant’s satisfaction to regulate the sys-
tem. When using virtual money, this is no more necessary
because the virtual money itself is a natural means of regu-
lation. Thus, in V MbQA, the mediator sets ω according to
the importance it wants to give to consumers’ intentions and
providers’ bids. If ω = 0, only the consumer’s intentions are
considered by the mediator, thus leading to providers dissat-
isfaction. Conversely, if ω = 1, the mediator only considers
bids, leading to consumers dissatisfaction. This is why the
mediator should set parameter ω according to the balance
between both consumers’ and providers’ satisfaction that it
wants to reach.
Table 1 shows the case of a competition. The consumer
asks for two providers, and more than two of them bid pos-
itively. Providers p5 and p3 are allocated the query because
they get the two highest levels, respectively 2.28 and 2.24.
Notice that the consumer’s intention with respect to p5 is
lower than its intention with respect to p3. Thus, p5 only
got the query because of its bid (2.25) which is higher than
p3’s bid (1.79), meaning that it wanted the query more than
p3. Table 2 shows an imposition case where no provider but
Table 1: V MbQA: a competition case
ω = 0.5 ; n = 2
Table 2: V MbQA: an imposition case
ω = 0.5 ; n = 2
p4 wants to treat the query, whereas the consumer asks for
two providers. Provider p5 is imposed the query because
of both its bid (which is the highest negative bid) and the
consumer’s intention with respect to it, which leads to the
value 1.47 of its level.
4.1.2 Invoicing phase
As start point, a natural strategy to invoice a provider p
that has been allocated a query q is that p pays what it has
bid for q, which is denoted by
−→
B [p]. Thus, given a query q,
the mediator computes the providers’ invoice as follows.
Definition 3. Provider’s Invoice If a provider p ∈ Pq
is allocated a given query q, then it must pay the amount
of virtual money it has offered to get q. Then, after the
payment for q, the new virtual money balance of p, balp, is
set as follows, balp = balp −
−→
B [p]
4.2 Bid Computation
A simple way to obtain providers’ bid, is that each
provider maintains a local bulletin board, which contains a
billing rate for its resources based on its preferences to per-
form queries (denoted by function prf). Then, a provider’s
bid for getting a query may be the product of its current uti-
lization by the billing rate, i.e. its preferences for the query
(such as in [13]). In our case, the context of a provider is
more complex: we have to consider its preferences, load, cur-
rent satisfaction, and current virtual money balance. Thus,
given a query q, a provider first works out its intention to
perform q by considering its preferences (denoted by func-
tion prfp(q), whose values are in the interval [−1..1]), its
current utilization, and its current satisfaction. Intuitively,
on the one hand, a provider may not pay so much attention
to its preferences and accepts sometimes queries it does not
desire if it is satisfied. On the other hand, if a provider is not
satisfied, it may focus on its preferences to obtain desired
queries. Then, a provider computes its intention as follows.
Definition 4. Provider’s Intention Given an incom-
ing query q, a provider p ∈ Pq computes its intention towards
q, pip(q), as follows,
pip(q) =
˛
˛
˛
˛
˛
˛
˛
˛
(prfp(q)
1−δs(p)) × (1 − Up(t))δs(p), if(prfp(q) > 0)∧
∧ (Up(t) < 1)
−
`
(1 − prfp(q) + 1)1−δs(p)×
×(Up(t) + 1)δs(p)
´
else
Once a provider obtains its intention with respect to a
query, it then proceeds to work out its bid to perform such
a query. Intuitively, the bid of a provider p is the product
of its intention by its current virtual money balance (balp).
Nonetheless, such a simple procedure may lead a provider
to spend all, or almost all, its money on only one query. To
avoid such a behavior, a provider offers at most a defined
percent of its current virtual money balance, denoted by
constant c0, 0 < c0 ≤ 1. Then, we define a provider’s bid as
in Equation 3, where constant c1 is set to the initial virtual
money balance of a provider.
Definition 5. Provider’s Bid Given an incoming
query q, a provider p ∈ Pq computes its bid to perform q,
bp(q), as follows,
bp(q) =
˛
˛
˛
˛
pip(q) · balp · c0 if pip(q) > 0
pip(q) · c1 otherwise
(3)
The idea behind the above definition is that a provider
always sets a positive bid when it desires to perform queries
and it is not overutilized, otherwise it sets a negative bid.
Notice that in traditional economic-based methods providers
just do not bid (or give a null bid) when they do not desire to
perform a query. However, this do not allow them to express
how much unpleasant it is for them to perform a query and
how much overloaded they are. Thus, Equation 3 allows
a provider to preserve its preferences while good response
times are also ensured to consumers. At first glance, there is
no difference between providers’ bids and intentions, but by
showing bids providers can keep private its real intentions.
4.3 Evaluation of VMbQA
Our aim in this evaluation is to analyze the impact of us-
ing virtual money to address the query allocation problem
defined in Section 2.3. To clearly see such an impact, we
compare V MbQA mediation with SQLB mediation, which
has been proved to perform well in autonomous environ-
ments. Also, to analyze the possible loss that V MbQA
may have with respect to providers due to the attention
it pays to consumers’ intentions, we compare V MbQA with
a provider-centric mediation: the first-price sealed-bid me-
diation (FPSB for short). Unlike V MbQA that allocates
queries by balancing consumers’ intentions with providers’
bid, FPSB allocates each incoming query to those providers
that have made the highest bid. In contrast, as in V MbQA
as in FPSB, a provider pays for a query what it has bid.
In Section 4.3.1, we describe the experimental setup and, in
Section 4.3.2, present the experimental results.
4.3.1 Evaluation Setup
The system consists of 200 consumers, 400 providers, and
only one mediator allocating all the incoming queries. We
assigned sufficient resources to the mediator so that it does
not cause bottlenecks in the system. We assume that con-
sumers compute their intentions by considering only their
preferences. Concerning a provider in SQLB mediation, on
the one hand, we assume that it computes its intentions as
defined in [9]. On the other hand, a provider in both FPSB
and V MbQA mediations computes its bid as defined in the
Section 4.2. To study all three mediations, we implemented
an observer that computes participants’ satisfaction as pre-
sented in Section 2.2. It initializes participants’ satisfaction
with a value of 0.5, which evolves with their last 200 issued
queries and 500 queries that have passed through providers
(i.e. k = 200 for a consumer and k = 500 for a provider).
We set the heterogeneity of the providers’ capacity in
accordance to the results presented in [11]. We gener-
ate around 10% of providers with low -capacity, 60% with
medium, and 30% with high. The high-capacity providers
are 3 times more powerful than medium-capacity and still 7
times more powerful than low -capacity providers. We gen-
erate two classes of queries that high-capacity providers per-
form in 1.3 and 1.5 seconds, respectively. We consider that
queries arrive to the system in a Poisson distribution, as
found in dynamic autonomous environments [5]. To sim-
ulate high heterogeneity of the consumers’ preferences for
allocating their queries to providers, we divide the set of
providers into three classes according to the interest of con-
sumers: to those that consumers have high interest (60% of
providers), medium interest (30% of providers), and low in-
terest (10% of providers). Consumers randomly obtain their
preferences between .34 and 1 for high-interest providers, be-
tween −.54 and .34 for medium-interest providers, and be-
tween −1 and −.54 for low -interest providers. On the other
side, to simulate high heterogeneity of the providers’ pref-
erences towards the incoming queries, we also create three
classes of providers: those that have high adaptation (35% of
providers), medium adaptation (60% of providers), and low
adaptation(5% of providers). Here, adaptation stands for
a provider’s degree of interest to perform incoming queries.
Providers randomly obtain their preferences between −.2
and 1 (high-adaptation), between −.6 and .6 (medium-
adaptation) or between −1 and .2 (low -adaptation).
Concerning participants’ departures, we assume on the
one hand that a consumer leaves the system, by dissatisfac-
tion if its satisfaction is smaller than .4. On the other hand,
we assume a provider may leave the system by three reasons:
(i) dissatisfaction if its satisfaction is smaller than 0.3, (ii)
by query starvation if, in an interval of 1 minute, it does
not perform a set of queries towards which it has a prefer-
ence of at least 0.2 in average, and (iii) by overutilization
if its utilization is greater than 1.5 if it is a high-capacity
provider, 2.5 if it is a medium-capacity provider, or 3 if it is
a low-capacity provider. Without any loss of generality, the
participants’ expectations, in the long run, are static in our
simulations. We assume this to evaluate all three mediations
in a long-term trend.
Finally, let us make the following assumptions. First, as
our main focus is to study if V MbQA performs equal or bet-
ter than SQLB, we do not consider the bandwidth problem
and assume that all participants have the same network ca-
pacities. Second, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that
consumers only ask for one informational answer (i.e. n = 1)
and that all the providers in the system are able to perform
all the incoming queries. Above assumptions do not harm
with the generality of our proposal.
4.3.2 Evaluation Results
Before going on to discuss the results, let us say that, for
space reasons, we do not present all results we obtained from
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(c) Response times.
Figure 2: (a-b) participants’ satisfaction results and (c) ensured response times, for different workloads.
this experimentation but the most relevant. That is, we only
discuss the results concerning the participants’ satisfaction
and response times ensured by all three mediations.
Figure 2(a) illustrates the consumers’ satisfaction results.
We can observe that V MbQA satisfies consumers much bet-
ter than FPSB and is not so far from SQLB. Obviously,
V MbQA outperforms FPSB because FPSB has no consid-
eration of the consumers’ intentions. However, when regard-
ing the providers’ satisfaction in Figure 2(b), we can observe
that V MbQA once again outperforms FPSB. This proves
that V MbQA has no loss in performance w.r.t. providers’
satisfaction while it has benefits from the consumers’ point
of view. Nonetheless, during our experimentations we ob-
served that FPSB better balances queries among providers
than V MbQA. This is because V MbQA also considers
the consumers’ intentions and thus, given the experimen-
tal setup, V MbQA tends to allocate queries to the most re-
puted providers (which are those providers that consumers
prefer in general) causing a query load imbalance in the sys-
tem. This is reflected in the response time ensured by both
two mediations, which is illustrated by Figure 2(c). We can
observe in those results that FPSB ensures lower response
times than V MbQA. It is however so far from SQLB, which
outperforms it by a factor of 2.
5. IMPROVEMENT OF VM BQA
Although V MbQA has no loss in performance concerning
providers’ satisfaction and only a small loss concerning re-
sponse times w.r.t. FPSB, it is still far from SQLB in all
cases: participants’ satisfaction and ensured response times.
An intuition to improve V MbQA is to change the way in
which it invoices providers. In this section, we present an-
other way to invoice providers [4] in Section 5.1 and evaluate
it in Section 5.2.
5.1 Invoicing Providers
We now discuss another manner to compare bids to rank
providers regarding their bids. Notice that bids cannot be
directly compared because of consumers’ intentions. Thus,
to overcome this difficulty, the theoretical bid is introduced
(BTh(p, l)), which corresponds to the amount that provider
p should bid for reaching level l. With ω 6= 0 and α = 1
if l ≥ 0, and α = −1 otherwise, BTh(p, l) is given by the
following formula,
BTh(p, l) = αmax(((α× l)
1
ω (
−→
CIq[p] + 1)
α(ω−1)
ω − 1), 0) (4)
For example, in Table 1, we have already noticed that
provider p5 gets a level slightly higher than p3’s, because
of its higher bid and despite the lower consumer’s intention.
In fact, to come exactly to p3’s level, p5 should bid 2.136
(theoretical bid). Now, given a provider p′ ∈ Pq,
−−→
PTr[p, p′]
denotes what p′ owes due to the allocation of q to p ∈ Pq
(
−−→
PTr[p, p′] = 0 if p is not allocated q). Then, the total
amount paid by p′ is defined by a sum (Equation 5).
∀p′ ∈ Pq , T
−−→rans[p′] =
P
p∈Pq
−−→
PTr[p, p′] (5)
There is a competition among providers when there are
enough providers that want to be allocated the query. In
that case, each of them pays the amount of its theoretical
bid to reach the level of the best provider which has not
been selected (in the spirit of a generalized Vickrey auc-
tion [14] except that the consumer’s intention is consid-
ered). In Table 1, only providers p5 and p3 pay (respec-
tively 2.09 and 1.75) to the mediator, thus decreasing their
own money balance (bal). A requisition case occurs when
at least one provider is imposed the query. Obviously, being
imposed does not meet at all the expectations of the im-
posed providers. Hence, to keep them satisfied in the long
run, the idea is then to distribute the cost of the imposition
on all the providers in Pq (in the spirit of [12], but also con-
sidering the consumer’s intentions). Then, having obtained
a reward, the imposed providers are more likely, in the fu-
ture, to obtain the queries they expect (because they have
more money) so leading to their satisfaction. The formal
definitions of the transfers in the imposition case are as in
definition below.
Definition 6. Partial Transfers in a Requisition
Case If provider p ∈ Pq is allocated q and
−→
B [p] < 0, then
for all p′ ∈ Pq:
−−→
PTr[p, p′] =
˛
˛
˛
˛
˛
˛
˛
˛
˛
˛
−BTh(p,
−→
L [
−→
R [min(n + 2, N)]])
N
ifp 6= p′
BTh(p,
−→
L [
−→
R [min(n + 1, N)]])
−
BTh(p,
−→
L [
−→
R [min(n + 2, N)]])
N
else
In the example of Table 2, p5 is imposed and thus gets
a 4.89 reward. All the providers contribute to this reward.
Notice also in both Table 1 and Table 2 that the mediator
gets some money left, which is of no use for it. We discussed
this point in Section 3.
5.2 Evaluation of VMbQA+
We implemented V MbQA
+ mediation, which selects
providers as V MbQA does but invoices them as defined in
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Figure 3: (a-b) participants’ satisfaction results and (c) ensured response times, for different workloads.
previous section. We compare V MbQA
+ with SQLB to
evaluate whether it can ensure the same system’s perfor-
mance as SQLB. Particularly, we evaluate whether the way
in which V MbQA
+ invoices providers improves the perfor-
mance of V MbQA. To be comparable with evaluated me-
diations in Section 4.3, we consider the same experimental
setup we used in Section 4.3.1 to run these experimentations.
5.2.1 Results
We can observe in Figures 3(a) and 3(b) that V MbQA
+
ensures the same participants’ satisfaction, with only a quite
small difference for low workloads, as SQLB. This is be-
cause the way in which V MbQA
+ invoices providers avoids
that some providers monopolize queries, thereby allowing
to better balance queries among providers. This allows
V MbQA
+ better satisfying providers without penalizing
consumers’ intentions. Figure 3(c) illustrates the response
times ensured by V MbQA
+. We observe that V MbQA
+
has the same performance as SQLB, however we can ob-
serve that for a workload of 20% of the total system capac-
ity SQLB slightly outperforms V MbQA
+. Even this small
difference we can see that V MbQA
+ generally performs as
well as SQLB. Thus, we can conclude that we can introduce
virtual money, without any loss of system’s performance, to
regulate a system as long as we care about the way in which
providers are selected and invoiced.
6. DEALING WITH SEVERAL MEDIA-
TORS: SUPER-PEER NETWORKS
We experimentally proved in previous section that
V MbQA
+ performs as well as SQLB in mono-mediator sys-
tems. In this section, we demonstrate that V MbQA
+ per-
forms well in multi-mediator systems, such as in super-peer
systems. A super-peer network is a pure peer-to-peer (P2P)
network, i.e. an unstructured P2P network, but each peer in
the network is actually a super-peer. A super-peer operates
as a server to a cluster of peers (participants) and as equal
participant with respect to other super-peers. We call a set
of participants with at least one of them playing the role of
super-peer a virtual organization (VO). Figure 4 illustrates
a super-peer network with 6 VOs. Notice that, one can see
a VO as a mono-mediator system. Thus, one can directly
use SQLB to perform query allocation inside a VO so as
to satisfy participants while ensuring good system perfor-
mance. Nevertheless, a super-peer becomes a single point of
failure for its VO as well as a potential performance and scal-
ability bottleneck. To avoid this, one can introduce redun-
Figure 4: Super-peer network with 6 super-peers,
which are represented by the SP peers.
Figure 5: A virtual organization (VO) with 3-
redundancy, where p peers represent those partic-
ipants that do not play the super-peer role.
dancy into the assignment of super-peers, which has been
experimentally proved to have gains in performance [15]. A
x − redundant VO is defined as follows.
Definition 7. x-redundant VO Let I′ denote the set
of participants in a VO and I′sp denote the set of participants
connected to super-peer sp. A VO is then said to be x −
redundant if and only if there is a set X of x participants,
with X ⊆ I′ and x > 1, playing the role of super-peer and
each participant in I′\X is connected to each super-peer sp
in X , such that ∀sp ∈ X , I′sp = I
′.
Figure 5 illustrates a x − redundant VO with 3 super-
peers, which form a single super-peer for the VO. In this
case, when a VO is x− rendundant, SQLB cannot perform
as well as in a mono-mediator system because the partic-
ipants’ satisfaction computed by each super-peer in X is
local and hence different. A simple solution may be that
the x super-peers in a VO frequently exchange messages to
update participants’ satisfaction. However, because of net-
work latency, even if mediators continually update partici-
pants’ satisfaction, there will be always a time period where
participants’ satisfaction is not the same at all mediators.
Moreover, these update messages considerably increase the
network traffic and hence hurt response times, which does
not allow the system to scale up. In contrast, V MbQA
+ has
no message to exchange among mediators because the sys-
tem regulation is done by the flow of virtual money instead
of by satisfaction. In other words, V MbQA
+ has no ad-
ditional cost when performing in a multi-mediator system.
Therefore, V MbQA
+ allows a VO, and hence a super-peer
system, to scale up with no loss in system performance. We
state this in the following Theorem.
Theorem 1. V MbQA
+ always satisfies (i) consumers
and (ii) providers in a x − redundant VO as well as in a
mono-mediator system.
Proof. Consider a x − redundant VO, denoted by Svo
and a mono-mediator system, denoted by Sm, consisting
of the same set of participants I′. Consider also that the
incoming queries in Svo are the same to those arriving in
Sm. We prove both (i) and (ii) by contradiction.
(i) Assume to the contrary that, for some query q, con-
sumer q.c ∈ I′ is not equally satisfied by Svo and Sm. If this
is the case, we can know, by Equation 1, that Svo allocated
q to a set cPq
′
such that ∃p ∈ cPq : p /∈ cPq
′
, where cPq is the set
of providers selected by Sm. Hence, we can know that the
set of relevant providers found by Svo is different to the set
found by Sm. This implies that provider p is not connected
to the super-peer that allocated q in Svo, which contradicts
the definition of a x − redundant VO.
(ii) Assume to the contrary that a provider p ∈ I′ is not
equally satisfied by Svo and Sm. Then, by Equation 2, we
can know that p did not perform the same set of queries
in Svo as in Sm. This means that p is not connected to all
super-peers in Svo so as to receive all queries it can perform,
which contradicts the definition of a x−redundant VO.
To discuss how queries may be forwarded to other VOs is
well beyond the scope of this paper.
7. RELATED WORK
Several approaches based on microeconomics have been
proposed [2, 3, 8, 13]. A survey of economic models for
various aspects of distributed system is presented in [3]. In
economic models the notion of utility is clearly linked to
satisfaction. Nonetheless, it is generally reduced to the al-
location of only one query and to monetary concerns. In
the field of distributed rational decision making [10], most
of the processes are individually rational: the utility of any
participant in the process is no less than the utility it would
have by not participating. This property is not relevant
in contexts where some participants may be imposed, which
implies having a lower utility in participating. Furthermore,
participants may have the interest that the system be effec-
tive and, in certain query allocations, some participants may
be interested in participating, even if this means to have a
low utility. Thus, to consider participants’ satisfaction is
still relevant in these contexts because it is a long-run no-
tion. In [7], the authors focus on the optimization algorithms
for buying and selling query answers, and the negotiation
strategy. However, this way of dealing with subqueries opti-
mization is orthogonal to our proposal and one may combine
them to improve performance. In [4], we proposed an eco-
nomic flexible mediation that allocates queries by taking into
account the quality and bids of providers, but it is inherently
assumed that consumers are only interested in the quality
of providers. In a recent work [9], we provide a query allo-
cation framework for distributed information systems with
autonomous participants, but we considered VOs with only
one super-peer, i.e. mono-mediator systems.
8. CONCLUSION
We addressed the query allocation problem in super-peer
data management systems. We presented a virtual money-
based query allocation mediation that behaves as good as
SQLB. We compared a non micro-economic mediation
(SQLB) with micro-economic ones (FPSB, V MbQA, and
V MbQA
+), by evaluating the participants’ satisfaction and
response times. From the results point of view, we showed
that, with both an adequate selection and invoice, a virtual
money based mediation shows results that are as good as
those of SQLB. This enables scaling up to a super peer
network where all the peers use the same virtual money,
without any additional cost for the allocation of a query.
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